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UNITED STATES V. ODONI, 782 F.3D
1226 (11TH CIR. 2015).
THE INTERNATIONAL LOOPHOLE TO
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT.
Stephanie C. Wharen*
INTRODUCTION
This case comment discusses and evaluates the Eleventh
United States v. Odoni,1 which appealed
criminal convictions of co-defendants Simon Odoni and Paul
Gunter for their involvement in an international investment
fraud scheme.2 While the defendants raised many issues on
appeal,3 I will focus on the most novel issue addressed by the
an agent of a foreign government constitutes a search under the
Fourth Amendment and, therefore, requires a warrant in order
to be lawful. 4 This case comment particularly addresses the
following: (1) whether a citizen traveling abroad has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in personal belongings; and
(2) whether an agent of a foreign government, particularly an
agent associated with foreign law
*
Candidate for Juris Doctor 2016, University of South
Carolina School of Law.
1
See United States of America v. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226
(11th Cir. 2015).
2
See id. at 1229-31.
3
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of
the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida in
arguments included the following: (1) that the district court lacked
personal jurisdiction; (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict;
(3) the court erred in denying the motion for a new trial; and (4) the
sentence was unreasonable. The Court of Appeals reviewed all of

denying his motion to suppress electronic evidence due to an unlawful
See
Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015).
4
See id. at 1237-40.
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article
takes the position that the Odoni decision expands the wellestablished, soa Fourth Amendment search has not occurred where the items
examined have been previously and knowingly exposed to third
parties.5

I. HISTORY
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.6
One of the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment is to
guard against arbitrary government intrusions and to provide
citizens with a sense of privacy in their own matters. This goal
is achieved by requiring that a search warrant be obtained prior
to executing a search in order for the search to be lawful. The
courts have established the exclusionary rule to protect against
7

Generally, the exclusionary rule prohibits the use of
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment from
being used against a defendant whose Fourth Amendment
rights were violated.8
Private intrusions not conducted under the authority of
the government are exempted from the Fourth

5

See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
6
U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
7
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,
392 (1920).
8
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
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requirements.9 Where a private party has first searched or been
exposed to the information, there is no longer a reasonable
expectation of privacy, and therefore, examination of anything
knowingly exposed or first searched by a third party is not a
search under the Fourth Amendment.10
The advent of technology has required courts to address
searches in the realm of electronic sources of evidence. In
United States v. Segura-Baltazar, the Eleventh Circuit held that
to prove an electronic search is unconstitutional, an individual
needs to show that there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy when the United States law enforcement entity viewed
the evidence. 11 The Supreme Court has previously held that the
Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures did not apply where United States agents searched
and seized property located in a foreign country owned by a
nonresident alien in the United States. 12 The Odoni decision
extends that holding to apply to citizens of the United States. 13

II. FACTS
Co-defendants Simon Andrew Odoni and Paul Robert
Gunter were convicted and sentenced in the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Florida. 14 Simon Odoni
was sentenced to 160 months in prison for one count of
conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to
commit money laundering, one count of engaging in illegal
monetary transactions, ten counts of mail fraud, and nine counts
of wire fraud.15
9

U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 119 20
(1984); Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1238 (11th Cir. 2015).
11
United States v. Segura-Baltazar, 448 F.3d 1281, 1286 (11th
Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th
Cir. 1995)).
12
United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 270
75 (1990).
13
See Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015).
14
Id.
15
Id. at 1230 31.
10
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his roles in two schemes. 16 The first was a fraudulent stock
scheme where he held two roles that lead to his convictions. 17
fabricated scripts in order to sell stock in shell companies. 18
Odoni also was the CEO of one of these shell companies,
Nanoforce, which did no actual business, although he issued
press releases with false statements to incentivize victims to
buy stocks.19
The second scheme was a forex-fraud scheme involving
the sale of foreign-exchange options. 20 Odoni provided escrow
services to Hartford Management Group by creating the
International Escrow Enterprises, which set up accounts to
receive investor funds; he received a five-percent escrow fee
from the company that was participating in foreign- exchange
options without informing investors of risks or placing trade
21
Simon Odoni appealed his
personal jurisdiction over him; (2) there was insufficient
evidence to convict him; (3) the district court erred in denying
his motion for a new trial; and (4) his 160- month sentence is
22

For his role in the two investment-fraud schemes, Paul
Gunter was sentenced to 300 months in prison for one count of
conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, one count of
conspiracy to commit wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to
commit money laundering, thirteen counts of engaging in
illegal monetary transactions, ten counts of mail fraud, and nine
counts of wire fraud. 23 Gunter provided escrow services and
managed bank accounts for both the fraudulent-stock and forexfraud schemes. 24 The Norfolk Constabulary seized
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Id. at 1229.
Id.
Id. at 1229 30.
See Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1230 (11th Cir. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1229.
Id. at 1237.
Id. at 1234.
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electronic evidence in the UK after looking into the fraudulent
stock scheme.25 Due to a lack of sufficient resources, the
(SFO) to step in.26 During its investigation, the SFO seized
several scripts for boiler rooms, notebooks, volumes of shares,
computers, and boxes of documents. The SFO documented and
placed all seized items in an office where only investigators had
access.27
bile phones, a
laptop computer, a thumb drive, some photo CDs, and a camera
were seized. 28 A forensic investigator from the SFO reviewed
these items in September 2007. 29 British authorities provided
the electronic evidence to
U.S. officials in late 2007, whereupon federal agents reviewed
the evidence without a search warrant. 30 On appeal, Gunter
suppress electronic evidence (and the fruits thereof),
U.S. authorities searched without obtaining a warrant. 31

III. DISCUSSION
A. REPORT
The Unites States Court of Appeals affirmed the United

acked personal jurisdiction
due to the methods used to bring him to the United States from
the Dominican Republic for prosecution, the appellate court
determined it did not violate the extradition treaty between the
two countries. 32 United States v. Arbane reiterated the KerFrisbie
defeat personal jurisdiction by

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

See Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1236 (11th Cir. 2015).
See id. at 1234.
Id. at 1235.
Id. at 1236.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1234.
See id. at 1232.
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asserting the illegality of the procurement of his presence in
33

First, Odoni claimed that his extradition fell within the one
exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 34
one exceptio
explicit provision making the treaty the exclusive means by
35
To prevail
reference to the express language of a treaty and/or the
established practice thereunder, that the United States
specifically agreed to not seize [the defendant] from the
36
Yet, the court determined that
xtradition
treaty, by its express terms, required the United States only to
obtain him through a formal extradition request; rather, the
court determined that when conditions of the treaty are met and
one government requests extradition, the other will uphold the
extradition.37
argument that the evidence used to convict him was
insufficient failed because the evidence was not just
sufficient, but overwhelming. 38 Appellate courts review
evidence sufficienc
government and draw all reasonable inferences and make all

33

United States v. Arbane, 446 F.3d 1223, 1225 (11th Cir. 2006)
(citing United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206, 1214 (11th Cir.1997)).
34
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1231.
35
Id. at 1231 (citing Arbane, 446 F.3d at 1225); See also United
States v. Alzarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 662 (1992) (noting that there
Ker only when . . . the terms of the
treaty provide that its bre
36
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1232 (quoting United States v. Noriega, 117
F.3d 1206, 1213 (11th Cir.1997)).
37
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1231-32; see also Convention Between the
United States and the Dominican Republic for the Extradition of
Criminals, Dom. Rep.-U.S., art. I, June 19, 1909, 36 Stat. 2468.
38
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1232.

74
39

Here, the court considered witness testimony from two
individuals who claimed Odoni discussed the fraud scheme
with them in depth. 40 Additionally, the court considered
involvement with fraudulent companies. 41 Thus, considering
the totality of the record, the court found that the evidence was
more than sufficient to sustain the convictions. 42
that the court erred by not
granting a mistrial the appellate court held that any such error
was harmless.43 Odoni argued that the district court violated
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43; the Rule states that the
defendant should be at every trial stage.44 However, the court
(addressing a potentially missing exhibit that was never entered
during trial) did not rise to the level of being absent from a trial
stage.45
Lastly, Odoni argued that his 160-month sentence was
unreasonable. The appellate court ruled that his sentence was
substantively reasonable. 46 The factors Odoni argued that
showed his sentence was unreasonable are codified in 18
U.S.C. §3553(a) and include his personal history, and the
characteristics of the offense; Odoni also argued some factors
outside the statute: his diminished role in the offense, and the
proportionality of his sentence compared to those of more
culpable co-defendants.47 The court used the review standard
set out in United States v. Irey
district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that

39

E.g., United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 697, 701 (11th
Cir. 1993).
40
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1232.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 1232-33.
43
Id. at 1233.
44
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(a).
45
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1233.
46
Id.
47
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012); Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1233 34.
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lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
48

sentence was warranted and not an abuse of discretion. 49
The Unites States Court of Appeals affirmed the United
on both issues Paul Gunter appealed but stated only one issue
the denial of a motion to suppress electronic evidence
warranted discussion.50 The Court of Appeals held the District
evidence.51 In reviewing this issue, the appellate court had to
address the search and seizure of the electronic evidence. 52
Gunter was not appealing the seizure of the evidence by the
foreign entity because of the exclusionary rule in the Fourth
Amendment. This is due to the fact that in United States v.
Morrow the court repeated the standard that the excl.ionary rule
cannot apply to seizures that occurred on foreign soil.53 To
States agents was unconstitutional, he had to prove an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. 54 However, the
precedent repeated in United States v. Jacobsen states that if a
private party, or foreign government agent, has searched the
content prior to the U.S. government agent, the individual no
longer has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 55 Since the
British officials searched the electronic data before sending
them to United States agents, Gunter no longer had a reasonable
of the electronic evidence in the United States was not a
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.56

48

Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1233 (quoting United States v. Irey,
612 F.3d 1160, 1188 89 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)).
49
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1233.
50
Id. at 1234.
51
Id. at 1240.
52
Id. at 1237.
53
United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 139 (5th Cir.
1976) (citing Birdswell v. United States, 346 F.2d 775, 782 (5th Cir.
1965)).
54
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1238.
55
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 119 20.
56
Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1289.
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B. ANALYSIS
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.57
duty rests upon
this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all
58
A
right to privacy and protection from an unreasonable search is
the essential principle of the Fourth Amendment.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has used the so-called
under the Fourth Amendment, and whether it leaves
information collected from third parties with no protection. 59
There is difficulty in creating a meeting place, which governs
how and when information should be accessible to police via a
third party.60 The difference between the generic third-party
doctrine and the situation in the Odoni case is that the third
party at play is a foreign investigative police force. 61 How far
can this extend? Indeed, how far should it extend?

57

U.S. CONST . amend. IV.
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 382 (1901) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
59
See Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth
Amendment: Protecting Third Party Information, Third Parties, and
The Rest of us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 975, 976 (2007) (The author
points out that the "third-party doctrine" affords no Fourth Amendment
protection to information in the hands of a third party).
60
See, id.
- party
usage).
61
See Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1234 (This is an international
investigation being conducted with the aid of the International
58
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In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court of the United
are involved, there can be no rulemaking or legislation which
62
In my opinion, the Odoni decision
creates a loophole that allows the U.S. government to overreach
and abrogates a federal right granted by the Constitution.
Searches that would be unlawful if conducted inside the United
States can now be lawful simply because a foreign entity, with
drastically different laws regarding search and seizures, looked
at the material first. This alone does not merit the expulsion of
United States has set a standard that a search warrant requires
probable cause, an oath or affirmation, a particular description,
and due process.63 Exceptions to this standard should be rare
and include exigent circumstances, search incident to arrest,
cars and containers, the plain-view doctrine, and consent. 64
Although it may be plausible that agents from a foreign legal
authority may act as individuals to provide an affirmation or
particular description, the simple fact alone that they have
viewed the electronic data should not be sufficient to violate an
warrant requirement is an essential element in our justice
system that should not be tossed aside lightly. The
reasonableness of the search should also be addressed.
Criminal Police O
well as British, Spanish, and Icelandic Police forces).
62
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966).
63
See, e.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 557 (2004) (holding
particularity is required in a search warrant as provided in Fourth
Amendment); Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41, 47 (1933)
(explaining a judicial official cannot issue a valid warrant without
finding probable cause given the facts presented to him under oath or
affirmation); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (clarifying the
right to privacy is enforceable against the states through the Due
Process Clause, and the Due Process Clause protects other rights such
offic
64

See Jeanette D. Brooks, Valid Searches and Seizures Without
Warrants,
INST.
GOV T
1 4,
6 7
(2004),
OF
http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/2004%20Fall%20Confe
rence/Exceptions.pdf.
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To determine if a search is unreasonable, a balancing test
between the government interest and privacy interest must be
weighed. Clearly, if there is a present emergency the justice
system allows for a lower standard for Fourth Amendment
privacy rights of an individual. The exigent circumstances
exception takes account for this specific instance. 65 However,
in situations where foreign police collect the evidence, there are
no exigent circumstances present absent immediate threats of
attack. The warrant requirement exemptions mentioned above
exist for a reason: to keep law enforcement and the community
safe.66 I believe the foreign loophole established in Odoni is
more of a loophole for matters of convenience rather than
necessity. In Odoni, the government failed to obtain a search
warrant because it was more convenient not to, not because
they were unable to obtain one. 67 Convenience should not be
Constitutional rights. In my opinion, foreign obtained evidence
intended to be used in a criminal proceeding in the United States
against a citizen of the United States should be held to the same
standard as domestic evidence; therefore, a search warrant
should be executed to retrieve it
government more quickly than its own failure to observe its
own laws, or worse, its disregard of the character of its own
68

practices get their first footing . . . by silent approaches and
foreign entity loophole is an appropriate depiction of this
standard.69
65

See generally id. at 1 2 (outlining the various exceptions
available to government agents to being required to obtain a warrant,
under so.
66
Cf. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 231 (1973)
(suggesting that officer safety and public safety were both important
67

Cf. Odoni, 782 F.3d 1226 (11th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that the
government did not obtain a warrant out of a sense of convenience and
not for reasons of exigency).
68
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 232 (1971) (quoting
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 US 643, 659 (1961)).
69
Wayne R. LaFave, Essay, The Forgotten Motto of Obsta
Principiis in Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 Ariz. L. Rev. 291,
294 (1989) (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635 (1886)).
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To some, this may seem like a meaningless or unnecessary step,
but it is the basis of the Fourth Amendment of the United States
granted to every citizen of the United States. 70 The Government
interest does not outweigh the privacy interest of an individual
simply because the information sought after is obtained in a
foreign country.71
C. PRACTICAL IMPACT
1. DECREASING INDIVIDUALS OURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTIONS
A significant practical impact of United States v. Odoni is
f the private-search doctrine and
72

under Odoni to encompass foreign law enforcement authorities.
73
This provides the U.S. government with a loophole around
States Constitution. 74 If any foreign law enforcement authority
conducts a search of a particular piece of evidence, then a
United States law enforcement authority would have the right
to search that piece of evidence as well, regardless of the
legality of the originally conducted search. 75 Treating a foreign
law authority the same as a

70

See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 61 (1967)

Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution).
71
But cf., Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1237 (suggesting that
government interests are outweighed by private privacy interests when
evidence is obtained in a foreign country).
72
Cf. Day Pitney LLP, United States: White Collar Roundup,
(Feb.
4,
2015),
MONDAQ
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/371552/Corporate+Crime/W
hite+Collar+Roundup+February+2015 (last visited Dec. 9, 2015)
Odoni decision).
73
Id.
74
See Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1238 39; Day Pitney LLP, supra
note 72.
75
Cf. Day Pitney LLP, supra note 72.
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private party is drastically unfair. In the United States, the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to a private action, such as
a neighbor finding something and turning it over to police.
However, the Fourth Amendment does apply if the person is a
law enforcement agent. In order to safeguard citizens
rights, this standard should apply similarly in a foreign capacity
as well. If a foreign individual turns something over to foreign
law enforcement, which is then provided to United States law
enforcement, then that evidence should be deemed acceptable
under the American standard, but not if the private party
viewing the evidence is a foreign law entity.

IV. CONCLUSION
The decision in Odoni expands the third-party exception to
searches by considering foreign law enforcement officers to fall
within its scope.76
expectations of privacy by following different search warrant
requirements than that of the Fourth Amendment while
decreasing the protections afforded by the Amendment.
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit in Odoni sets a new
precedent by treating foreign law enforcement entities as
private parties, eliminating the need for a search warrant if
foreign law enforcement views evidence prior to turning it over
to United States law enforcement. The question then becomes,

76

Odoni, 782 F.3d at 1237.

